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Take Me Out to the Metaphor 
PARKER B. POTTER, JR.∗
In the fall of 2003, Judge Smith of the United States District Court for 
the District of Rhode Island wrote that “[c]ases examining the issue of 
workplace sexual harassment by women against women are about as com-
mon as a baseball post-season that includes the Cubs and the Red Sox . . . 
.”1  Judge Smith’s observation was, of course, rooted in the perception 
among baseball fans, and in the popular culture, that nothing says “futility” 
quite like a reference to the Chicago Cubs or the Boston Red Sox.2  Con-
versely, there can be little doubt that for one in search of a baseball meta-
phor for success, all roads lead to the Bronx, home of the New York Yan-
kees.  This article examines judicial references to the Cubs, Red Sox, and 
  
 ∗ Adjunct Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center; Law Clerk to the Hon. John T. Broderick, Jr., 
Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.  This article is dedicated to the late Professor F. 
Dane Buck, Jr., in whose memory a Boston Red Sox jersey hangs in a building at Pierce Law that bears 
his name. 
 1. Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D.R.I. 2003).  Mann was the only opinion I found that 
linked metaphorical references to the Cubs and the Red Sox, but I did find one wonderful instance of 
parallelism.    
  In Gentry v. Rigsby, No. 01A01-9610-CV00455, 1997 WL 311539 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 11, 
1997), the proponent of a will attempted, unsuccessfully, to demonstrate the competence of the testator 
by testifying that she and the testator “frequently watched baseball up to the time of his death and that 
[he] knew the names, statistics, and batting averages of the players for his favorite team, the Chicago 
Cubs.”  Id. at *6.  However, in Lombardi v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. CV010167187S, 2004 WL 
574635 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2004), a victorious personal injury plaintiff successfully fought off a 
motion for remittitur based in part on his son’s testimony that the plaintiff “would come to forget 
names, dates, phone numbers, times of his favorite TV shows, and the players on his beloved Red 
Sox.”  Id. at *2.  Based on the foregoing, it would seem that the ability to remember players on the 
Cubs does not demonstrate mental capacity while the inability to remember players on the Red Sox is a 
compensable injury.  One wonders whether the converse is true.  I will be monitoring future slip opin-
ions with an eye toward answering this pressing question. 
 2. The New York Mets, of course, were spectacularly awful in their first season.  See, e.g., JIMMY 
BRESLIN, CAN’T ANYBODY HERE PLAY THIS GAME? (1963).  But the Mets blew their chance to be in 
this article by winning the World Series in 1969, an accomplishment noted by Judge Motz in his opin-
ion in a trademark infringement action brought against a vendor who sold “Camden Yards” tee shirts 
outside Baltimore’s Memorial Stadium: 
       Construction [of Camden Yards] proceeded apace during the long winter months, and 
on a cold but glorious afternoon in early April, 1992, the park was first opened for an exhi-
bition game between the Baltimore Orioles and the New York Mets (a team last seen, un-
happily, in Baltimore in the 1969 World Series).  The following day the Orioles’ official 
season began with a game against the Cleveland Indians (who, even more unhappily, had 
beaten the Orioles 19 out of 21 times in 1954 when Memorial Stadium, the Birds’ former 
park, had been opened). 
Md. Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (D. Md. 1992).  The Mets’ meteoric rise to 
success—they won the World Series in their eighth season—has since been eclipsed by the Florida 
Marlins (who won the Series in their fifth season) and the Arizona Diamondbacks (who won the Series 
in their fourth season).  I guess they just don’t make losers like they used to. 
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Yankees that are based on the ongoing ninety-eight-year wait for a World 
Series championship on the North Side of Chicago, the recently ended 
eighty-six-year drought between titles in Beantown,3 and the twenty-six 
World Series trophies won so far by the men in pinstripes.4  
I. URSINE FUTILITY 
The earliest and perhaps most colorful reference to the ineptitude of 
the Chicago Cubs came from the pen of Judge Shadur of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, who once wrote: 
       From this point forward the analysis owes nothing to the ef-
forts of the litigants.  All the authorities supporting Triangle’s view 
were uncovered not by its lawyers but by this Court’s law clerk, C. 
Steven Tomashefsky, Esq. (Triangle having made a bald conclu-
sory statement lacking a single supporting authority).  Action’s 
non-Chicago counsel were no better.  Their two-page Reply Brief 
simply denied the applicability of UCC § 2-201(3) without citing 
even one case or treatise, again foisting on this Court’s clerk the 
job of finding all the authorities for this Court’s review and analy-
sis.  If lawsuits were decided as law school exam papers were 
graded, the result here would be the same as that predicted by the 
late sportswriter Warren Brown after watching the wartime Chi-
cago Cubs and Detroit Tigers warm up for the 1945 World Series: 
Both sides would lose.5
  
 3. Obviously, the value of the Red Sox as a metaphor for futility diminished with the team’s vic-
tory in the 2004 World Series, but not so much as one might think.  Old habits of mind die hard. 
 4. My Cubs/Red Sox/Yankees triple-play is not entirely unique.  In City of Anaheim v. Superior 
Court, No. GO35159, 2005 WL 1523338 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2005), a case in which the City of 
Anaheim sought to enjoin its local baseball team from changing its name from “California Angels” to 
“Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim,” Judge Aronson explained the custom and practice of naming base-
ball teams with “the name of a city or geographical region followed by the mascot or moniker name: 
Boston Red Sox, New York Yankees, Chicago Cubs.”  Id. at *16. 
 5. Triangle Mktg., Inc. v. Action Indus., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1578, 1582 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1986).  As a 
law clerk myself, I am particularly impressed by Judge Shadur’s tip of the cap to his man in the bull-
pen. 
       I have also been impressed, on multiple occasions, by Judge Shadur’s facility with literary refer-
ences.  See, e.g., Parker B. Potter, Jr., Ordeal By Trial: Judicial References to the Nightmare World of 
Franz Kafka, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 195, 226 n.202 (2005) (noting Judge Shadur’s prolific references to 
Franz Kafka’s works); Parker B. Potter, Jr., Surveying the Serbonian Bog: A Brief History of a Judicial 
Metaphor, 28 TUL. MAR. L.J. 519, 550 n.177 (2004) (noting Judge Shadur’s use of the Shakespearian 
phrase “paint the lily”); Parker B. Potter, Jr., Wondering About Alice: Judicial References to Alice in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 177 n.7 (2006) (noting Judge 
Shadur’s references to the works of Lewis Carroll). 
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The sad fate of the Cubs has also been recognized at the highest levels of 
the federal judiciary; in Waters v. Churchill,6 which involved an em-
ployee’s claim that her termination violated the First Amendment, Justice 
Scalia noted, in a concurring opinion, that under Justice O’Connor’s analy-
sis for the majority, “if the requisite ‘First Amendment investigation’ dis-
closed that [the plaintiff] had not been demeaning her superiors, but had 
been complaining about the perennial end-of-season slump of the Chicago 
Cubs, her dismissal, erroneous as it was, would have been perfectly OK.”7
In a case in which the Cubs were themselves defendants8 in a suit 
brought by a former ball person aggrieved by the team’s decision to elimi-
nate the position of ball person, the plaintiff attempted to meet her burden 
at the third step of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis by 
“revil[ing] the Cubs for the team’s perceived incompetence, both on and 
off the field, from 1908 to the present.”9  While that strategy was not suc-
cessful, Judge Zagel did commiserate to a degree, at the start of his opin-
ion:  
The current baseball strike is only the latest in a number of indigni-
ties recently inflicted upon followers of the Chicago National 
League Baseball Club, Inc.: the introduction of night games at 
Wrigley Field; the trading of Lou Brock; the departure of Cy 
Young Winner Greg Maddux; and, as this lawsuit alleges, the 
elimination, in 1992, of the position of “ball person.”10
Given the subject matter and the claims before him, Judge Zagel concluded 
his opinion in a most appropriate manner: 
       A fair game requires a clear set of rules, binding on all players 
equally, which must ultimately be construed by the appropriate au-
thority.  This is as true in federal court, where the judge rules on 
motions, as it is in baseball, where the umpire rules.  Ms. Schoe-
  
 6. 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 7. Id. at 688 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 8. I recognize that “Cubs” is a singular noun, but the mental image of a counsel table occupied by 
several juvenile bears is just too hard to resist. 
 9. Schoeneck v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696, 700 (N.D. Ill. 1994).  Sadly, I 
do not have access to the plaintiff’s brief and must, therefore, rely on the judge’s characterization of it. 
 10. Id. at 699.  Judge Zagel is not the only judge who expressed displeasure over the 1994 baseball 
strike.  See Hunt’s Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp. 879, 881 (E.D. Wis. 
1994).  The author of Hunt’s Generator, Judge Evans, appears to have had a longstanding concern with 
baseball strikes, noting in 1985 that: “[bookies] do a greater business in October, during the height of 
the professional college and football season than they do in August during the dog days of the baseball 
season, strike or no strike.”  Breider v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (E.D. Wis. 1985).  In a 
case involving a different kind of criminal activity, Judge Evans once explained that “we can’t expect 
that drug dealers will keep the kind of meticulous records maintained by the editors of ‘Total Base-
ball.’”  United States v. Medina, 430 F.3d 869, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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neck has made three claims, each of which would fail before a jury 
as a matter of law.  A federal judge knows, along with everyone 
else, that in baseball there is only one possible call to be rendered 
after three successive strikes. 
       Summary judgement [sic] granted.11
In another case involving claims of employment discrimination, Judge 
Loken of the Eighth Circuit also acknowledged the historic incompetence 
of the Cubs in his discussion of a McDonnell-Douglas pretext analysis: 
A prime example of irrelevant pretext evidence are the scraps of 
newsroom backbiting related at length in the court’s opinion.  To 
survive, television stations must focus on a personality’s ability to 
attract audience, not on his age or the bags under his eyes.  One of 
the most beloved sportscasters today is the elderly Harry Caray, 
whose nationwide broadcasts of Chicago Cubs baseball games 
have helped make the perennially unsuccessful Cubs one of the 
most popular teams in the National League.  Does the court seri-
ously believe that KARE 11 would have non-renewed a term con-
tract with Harry Caray because some ambitious but unproven un-
derling complained that he was an “old fart” who shouldn’t be on 
the air?12
One would think that “old farts” in the air are far more vexing than “old 
farts” on the air, but that is a discussion for another day. 
In a frequently cited opinion in a contract case, Judge Easterbrook of 
the Seventh Circuit relied upon the incompetence of the Cubs when reject-
ing the argument that “the presence of a termination clause implies an enti-
tlement to a refund, although the contract lacks any provision for a re-
fund.”13  In Judge Easterbrook’s words: 
There are of course many other situations in which one side’s abil-
ity to walk away from a transaction does not establish an entitle-
ment to a refund. . . .  Consider . . . the purchaser of season tickets 
for a baseball team.  That the Chicago Cubs turn out to be the 
doormat of the National League would not entitle the ticket holder 
to a refund for the remaining games, any more than the star tenor’s 
laryngitis entitles the opera goer to a refund when the understudy 
takes over the role.  In each case, however, the ticket holder has 
the same right to “terminate” that Seko enjoyed: instead of going 
  
 11. Schoeneck, 867 F. Supp. at 703. 
 12. Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1092 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (Loken, J., dissenting). 
 13. Seko Air Freight, Inc. v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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to the Cubs game, the fan may head south for Comiskey Park and 
the White Sox, just as Seko may turn to another bill collector.  So 
there is no general rule that a right to terminate implies a right to a 
refund . . . .14
Dayton Development Co. v. Gilman Financial Services, Inc.15 involved a 
novel theory of standing advanced by a defendant claiming to be a third-
party beneficiary of a lease to which it was not a party: “[O]ur standing is 
kind of like Tinker[] to Evers to Chance, A to B to C, and that Chance has 
standing to beef about Tinker[’s] throw to the second baseman because he 
is ultimately going to get the out.”16  Judge Kyle rejected the defendant’s 
theory, explaining: 
       As long-suffering fans of the Chicago Cubs are well aware, 
shortstop Joe Tinker, second baseman Johnny Evers, and first 
baseman Frank Chance constituted the Cubs’ legendary (and 
sometimes infamous) double-play combination, immortalized by 
Franklin Pierce Adams in a 1910 poem: 
       These are the saddest of possible words:  
       “Tinker to Evers to Chance.”  
       Trio of bear cubs, and fleeter than birds,  
       Tinker and Evers and Chance.  
       Ruthlessly pricking our gonfalon bubble,  
       Making a Giant hit into a double— 
       Words that are heavy with nothing but trouble:  
       “Tinker to Evers to Chance.” 
New York Evening Mail (July 10, 1910).  Tinker, Evers, and 
Chance are all in the Hall of Fame on the basis of their inclusion in 
Adams’s poem.  While the Court enjoys counsel’s creativity, it 
finds that Gilman is out in left field (rather than on first base) with 
regard to the User Lease.17
While there are several more judicial reverences to “Tinker to Evers to 
Chance,” those venerable teammates played during the Cubs’ early-
twentieth-century glory days, which lie outside the scope of an article de-
voted to references to Cub failures. 
  
 14. Id. 
 15. 299 F. Supp. 2d 933 (D. Minn. 2003). 
 16. Id. at 937 (quoting the transcript of the oral argument). 
 17. Id. at 937 n.2.  
318 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
In an opinion written after the decision in Blakely v. Washington,18 but 
before the decision in United States v. Booker,19 Judge Benson of the Dis-
trict of Utah used to great effect a recent episode from the Cubs’ unhappy 
history: 
The predictions of the [Federal Sentencing] Guideline’s demise are 
many and they may well be true.  It is difficult to read Blakely and 
not see the same wrecking ball heading directly for the sentencing 
features of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.  But 
predictions don’t always hold; even sure things sometimes surprise 
us.  Just last October, thousands of Chicago Cubs fans were certain 
of their team’s first World Series appearance in ninety-five years, 
with a mere five outs to make against the Florida Marlins.  Then 
one of the Cubs’ own fans interfered with the catch of a foul ball, 
and the unraveling began.  As Mark Twain observed in 1897 that 
“the reports of my death are greatly exaggerated,” the Sentencing 
Guidelines may similarly defy present expectations of their im-
pending demise.  A distinction, however fine, may be drawn be-
tween the Federal Guidelines and the State of Washington’s 
Guidelines.  Other issues could become involved.  A vote could 
switch.  And so on.20
I conclude my discussion of ursine futility with a novel suggestion for im-
proving the Cubs’ chances for success that was concocted by Judge Bur-
gess of the Texas Court of Appeals, in a forcible entry and detainer action 
involving a commercial premises: 
       It is difficult to improve on Justice Shannon’s words in Meyer 
[v. Young, 545 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)], or to be more 
logical than the Tyler court in Housing Auth., City of Edgewood [v. 
Sanders, 693 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. App. 1985)].  However, I can point 
out the absurdity of the Academy [v. Sunwest N.O.P., Inc., 853 
S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App. 1993)] holding.  A displaced and disgrun-
tled Chicago Cubs fan could file a forcible detainer action in the 
appropriate justice court in Harris County alleging he had a lease-
hold on the Astrodome from Harris County, the owner; as landlord 
he had sublet the Astrodome to a tenant, the Houston Astros Base-
ball Club and, for whatever reason, the Astros were a holdover 
  
 18. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 19. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 20. United States v. Olivera-Hernandez, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187 (D. Utah 2004).  After Booker 
was decided, Judge Benson’s colleague, Judge Cassell, quoted the opinion in Olivera-Hernandez and 
called it “[p]erhaps the best (and most colorful) example” of the wait-and-see approach to the logical 
implications of Blakley.  Rucker v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 (D. Utah 2005). 
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tenant or a tenant at will or sufferance.  The Astros would defend, 
alleging they were in direct privy with Harris County and thus a 
tenant of Harris County, not a tenant of the fan, therefore no land-
lord-tenant relationship, no jurisdiction.  The justice court could, 
without evidence or against the evidence, render judgment for the 
fan.  Confident justice would prevail, the Astros would appeal to 
one of the county courts at law of Harris County, once again as-
serting no landlord-tenant relationship, no jurisdiction.  All those 
jurists, being avid Astro fans, would voluntarily recuse themselves 
and a visiting judge from Dallas, an avid Rangers fan, would hear 
the de novo appeal.  This second court could, without evidence or 
against the evidence, render judgment for the Cub fan and issue a 
writ of execution ordering the Astros out.  [Note: the Chicago fan 
has manipulated the time sequence so a four game series between 
Chicago and Houston, scheduled for the Dome, must now be 
moved to Wrigley Field].  A virtual army of three-piece, pin-
stripe-suited lawyers delve into legal research with all the intense-
ness, vigor and resolve of an at bat by Jeff Bagwell, Astro slugger 
and first baseman.  They expect to find a belt high, middle of the 
plate, fast ball,—i.e., although Section 24.007 precludes appellate 
review on the merits in a forcible detainer suit, the statute does not 
prevent a court of appeals from determining whether the county 
court had jurisdiction of the cause.  Instead, they find a low and 
outside the strike zone, curve ball,—i.e., proof that a landlord-
tenant relationship existed between the parties is just one of the 
elements required to support a forcible detainer action, but this 
proof is not jurisdictional; it is required to show who has the 
greater right of possession and the question of possession is not re-
viewable by a court of appeals (Academy Corp. v. Sunwest N.O.P., 
Inc.).  To add insult to injury, this “curve ball” is out of the very 
court of appeals they must rely on for relief.  However, unlike the 
great all-star hitter, they will not get an at bat, much less hit one 
out of the park.  The scoreboard: 
ACADEMY CORP. 1 
ASTROS   021
Somehow, it seems less than accidental that Judge Burgess drafted a Cubs 
fan rather than, say, a Cardinals fan or a Dodgers fan to make his point. 
  
 21. A.V.A. Servs., Inc. v. Parts Indus. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 852, 857 (Tex. App. 1997) (Burgess, J., 
concurring) (footnote omitted). 
320 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
II. THE CURSE OF THE BAMBINO 
From 1918 until they won the 2004 World Series, the Boston Red Sox 
labored under the so-called “curse of the Bambino.”  As famous as that 
phrase is, at least in New England, it has found its way into only one judi-
cial opinion, in a case involving a bankruptcy trustee’s attempt to sell Red 
Sox season tickets.22  However, without invoking the curse, several other 
courts have taken judicial notice of the tribulations of the “Olde Towne 
Team.” 
In an attempt to define the term “competitive,” Judge Pickard of the 
Connecticut Superior Court took what appears to be a backhanded shot at 
the Red Sox: “From 1918 until last season the Yankees and Red Sox teams 
were said to have been ‘competitive with’ each other (‘the greatest rivalry 
in sports’) even though the Yankees had won 26 World Series titles and the 
Red Sox none.”23  Ouch.  Moreover, even after the Red Sox had managed 
to win the fall classic, their former difficulties were hard for some judges 
to forget.  In ruling that “[t]attoos are not inherently prejudicial,” Justice 
Carter of the Texas Court of Appeals observed that “[s]ome ardent fans 
celebrate[d] the long awaited World Series championship by displaying the 
Boston Red Sox logo as a tattoo.”24  And in Washington v. Culotta,25 
Judge Straniere of the New York City Civil Court went just a bit further: 
“The Court would have said a closing would never have been scheduled 
[without a temporary Certificate of Occupancy], but having witnessed the 
Red Sox winning the World Series the way that they did, and in other liti-
  
 22. Grossman v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. P’ship (In re Platt), 292 B.R. 12, 17 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2003) (“The ticket holder need only sign his invoice and pay the amount owed, and although he 
may wait in eager anticipation that this year will be the year the Red Sox win the World Series and 
shed the ‘curse of the Bambino,’ he need do nothing else.”). 
 23. Barber v. Skip Barber Racing Sch., LLC., No. CV030090036S, 2005 WL 3509774, at *9 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2005).  The rivalry between the Yankees and the Red Sox has surfaced in at least 
one other opinion: 
The allocation to the legislative body of responsibility for the design of procedures, rather 
than the executive branch, would present sound policy reasons when the executive branch is 
designated with the authority to negotiate with the union.  Thus, in order to promote a “har-
monious and cooperative” relationship envisioned by the Taylor Law, it would be best 
served that the executive branch not also dictate the rules and procedures by which the ne-
gotiations take place.  Otherwise, it would be the equivalent to the Red Sox dictating the 
rules of the World Series games against the Yankees. 
Mayor of New York v. Council of the City of New York, 800 N.Y.S.2d 349, 2005 WL 351073, at *6 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2005) (unpublished table decision).  I can only presume, from Judge Ling-
Cohan’s reference to a World Series pitting two American League teams against one another, that 
baseball is not as hot a topic of conversation in her chambers as it is in the chambers I have worked in 
(or, presumably, the chambers of Judge Evans). 
 24. Mason v. State, No. 06-03-00254-CR, 2004 WL 2952663, at *3 & n.1 (Tex. App. Dec. 22, 
2004) (citation omitted). 
 25. 9 Misc.3d 1105(A), 2005 WL 2171189 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 21, 2005) (unpublished table deci-
sion). 
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gation found legal malpractice when such a closing took place, the improb-
able is no longer impossible.”26  Double ouch. 
In one of the earlier judicial opinions to recognize the plight of the Red 
Sox, Justice Kelleher of the Rhode Island Supreme Court had this to say 
about a majority opinion in which the Court held that automobile insurance 
hit-and-run coverage was implicated when the policyholder swerved out of 
the way of an oncoming car (which then drove off), and hit a telephone 
pole instead: 
       It is my belief that when the legislators in 1962 opted for pro-
tection against the hit-and-run driver, they never imagined that 
some nineteen years later a judicial body would, with a bit of se-
mantic legerdemain, change the term “hit and run” into “miss and 
run.”  Houdini would certainly appreciate such “sleight of eye,” 
but the legislators, Class of 1962, who are still possessed of an 
ability to recall, will, I suggest, shake their heads in disbelief upon 
learning that when they said “hit” in 1962, they really meant 
“miss.” 
       This court has repeatedly said that when the language of a stat-
ute is free from ambiguity and expresses a clear, sensible meaning, 
there is no room for statutory construction, and the court must give 
the words their plain and obvious meaning.  “Hit and run” are 
words of common, everyday meaning.  The word “hit” is defined 
in Webster’s Third International Dictionary as “1 a: a blow striking 
an object aimed at contrasted with miss * * * b: an impact of one 
thing against another: COLLISION.” 
       It is interesting to note that when the Legislature approved the 
uninsured-motorist statute in 1962, the approval came from both 
branches on the sixtieth and last day of the January 1962 session.  
At that moment, the Boston Red Sox baseball team had just begun 
another one of the team’s many fruitless pursuits of the American 
League championship.  All of the Red Sox players and just about 
every legislator were highly aware at that time of the year that be-
fore one can have a successful execution of the hit-and-run play in 
baseball, the batter must hit the ball. 
       A pedestrian who is struck by an unidentified motor vehicle 
and then has the misfortune of seeing the automobile leave the 
scene will tell anyone who inquires about his or her physical wel-
fare that he or she has been involved in a hit-and-run accident. 
  
 26. Id. at *1. 
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        In The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage (1978 ed.), the phrase “hit-and-run” is classified as an adjec-
tive which describes “the driver of a motor vehicle who drives on 
after striking a pedestrian or another vehicle”; or, when used in a 
baseball sense, describes a play in which a man on base runs with . 
. . the pitch, and the batter attempts to hit the ball.”  It is obvious 
that my colleagues care little for our American heritage or the pub-
lication that bears that title. 
       With all due deference to my associates, the General Assem-
bly knew exactly what it was doing when it first afforded protec-
tion against the uninsured and hit-and-run motorist.  If the Legisla-
ture ever intended to include protection against the “miss-and-run” 
motorist, it was perfectly capable of saying so, but it did not.  The 
majority has, under the guise of a liberal construction, amended a 
statute that, because of its clear, precise prose, needs no such 
amendment.27
In another case from Rhode Island, Superior Court Judge Carrellas did not 
go so far as to refer to the efforts of the Red Sox as “fruitless,” but intro-
duced the discussion of his final point in the following way: “Like the Red 
Sox, the Court wants to touch all bases (and hopefully with more success 
than they’ve attained).”28  Judge Laurence of the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals, in a workers’ compensation case arising out of an employee’s 
injury while playing for the company softball team, got an assist from the 
Red Sox in his explanation of the company team’s poor play: “The J & P 
team’s 1986 season was one of unremitting futility that would have dispir-
ited even hardened Red Sox fans.”29
While Judge Laurence was concerned with J & P’s dismal 1986 sea-
son, the fate of the 1986 Red Sox was on the mind of Judge Evans of the 
Eastern District of Wisconsin when he wrote the following footnote: 
       The year 1975 brought us one of the greatest moments in 
World Series history.  The sixth game of the Series, one of the 
greatest ever played, saw Boston’s Bernie Carbo hit a three-run 
pinch hit homer which paved the way for Carlton Fisk’s game 
  
 27. Pin Pin H. Su v. Kemper Ins. Cos./Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 416, 420 (R.I. 1981) (Kel-
leher, J., dissenting). 
 28. Fidrych v. Inskip Motors, Inc., No. C.A. 73-1284, 1982 WL 604065, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 
6, 1982).  And no, the plaintiff in that case was not New England native, and one-time Pawtucket Red 
Sox pitcher, Mark “The Bird” Fidrych.   
 29. Bengston’s Case, 609 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).  Specifically: “Of the sched-
uled twenty-six games, the team failed to win any, losing several by forfeit because it fielded an insuf-
ficient number of players at game time.”  Id.  
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winning round tripper in the bottom of the 12th.  Red Sox joy 
faded, however, in game seven, when future Hall of Famer Joe 
Morgan’s bloop single in the ninth gave the Cincinnati Reds the 
Series.  The Red Sox didn’t return to the big show again until 
1986, and then Mookie Wilson’s dribbler through the legs of Bill 
Buckner multiplied the Series sadness in Beantown.30
Judge Evans’s opinion, written during the 1994 baseball strike, contains a 
remarkable compendium of baseball information.  He began by noting: 
       A few months ago, I thought I would, at this time, be getting 
ready to watch the World Series.  As a baseball lover, that was a 
warm thought indeed.  But alas, the World Series is not, this year, 
meant to be.  So my attention is not on baseball today but on this 
case, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., The Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA).  Please excuse me if, while discussing the case, my 
mind wanders a bit to things that might have been. 
       The plaintiffs are an unincorporated association of corpora-
tions (much like the owners of major league baseball teams), re-
ferred to as Hunt’s Generator Committee.  They have entered into 
a consent decree with the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency for cleanup of a landfill, known as Hunt’s Landfill, in 
Racine County, Wisconsin.  The consent decree served the purpose 
of a salary cap limiting the financial liability of the members of the 
committee.  The committee seeks contribution from the defen-
dants, who are other entities potentially responsible for the 
cleanup.  One of the defendants, Mid-America Steel Drum Co., 
Inc., has moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal from the 
lawsuit on the basis that it is not a successor to the potential liabil-
ity of Northwestern Drum Company.  It is not unlike the situation 
in 1970 when the Milwaukee Brewers wanted nothing to do with 
the debts of their predecessor, the Seattle Pilots.31
 
The judge’s mind did indeed wander, quite dramatically, as evidenced by 
his referring to “the Court of Appeals for the Seventh (as in inning stretch) 
Circuit,”32 “the Court of Appeals for the Eighth (as in ‘dial 8’) Circuit” 
  
 30. Hunt’s Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp. 879, 882 n.3 (E.D. Wis. 
1994).  
 31. Id. at 881. 
 32. Id. at 882. 
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(“dial 8” is baseball slang for hitting a home run),33 and “the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth (as in bottom of the ninth inning) Circuit.”34  And then, 
whenever the recitation of the facts of the case required him to give a date, 
Judge Evans dropped a footnote mentioning memorable events in baseball 
history that had occurred on that same date.35  I would imagine that the 
opening day of the 1995 baseball season was a happy day indeed in the 
chambers of Judge Evans. 
III. THE (EVIL) EMPIRE STRIKES BACK 
Having surveyed references to futility in Fenway, I now head south 
down I-95, to the House that Ruth built, and baseball’s preeminent meta-
phor for success.  However, it is worth noting that even for the Yankees, 
there have been occasional setbacks, as noted by Judge Crawford of the 
  
 33. Id. at 883 & n.6. 
 34. Id. at 883. 
 35. Elevation to the court of appeals seems not to have dampened Judge Evans’s ardor for the na-
tional pastime.  Consider the first paragraph of his opinion in Rothe v. Revco D.S., Inc., 148 F.3d 672 
(7th Cir. 1998): 
       Nineteen fifty-eight, with the possible exception of Uncle Sam’s drafting of Elvis, was 
a tranquil and simple time.  Consider, for example, baseball: no artificial turf, free agency, 
designated hitters, slick agents, .235 hitting second basemen with multimillion-dollar guar-
anteed contracts, or domed stadiums, and all seven World Series games (pitting, as it also 
did in 1957, the New York Yankees against the Milwaukee Braves) played on natural grass 
under natural light.  This case takes us back to that simple time for it was in 1958 that Obed 
and Mary Ellis leased a small property in Frankfort, Indiana (1990 population 14,754) to 
Hook Drugs, Inc. for the operation of a drugstore.  Today we consider what that old lease 
had to say, or perhaps more accurately not say, about the duty of the lessee to continue to 
operate the drugstore in the mid-1990’s. 
Id. at 673; see also United States v. Cross, 289 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2002) (“There is no dispute that 
Cross’s criminal activities span 4 presidential administrations and some 15 baseball seasons.  Children 
born in the era of Cross’s earliest recorded cons are now getting dates for the prom.”). 
       But Judge Evans is not alone in using baseball to tell time in a judicial opinion.  For example, there 
is this from Judge Miller: 
       It was the year 1962.  John Fitzgerald Kennedy was President of the United States.  The 
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr[, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)] paved the way for the reapportion-
ment of state legislatures.  Stan Musial was paid the outrageous salary of $65,000 a year just 
because he could hit a baseball better than about anyone who ever picked up a bat.  Roger 
Maris hit 61 home runs for the New York Yankees, but teammate Mickey Mantle beat him 
out for Most Valuable Player in the American League.  The Green Bay Packers beat the 
New York Giants in the AFL [sic] Championship Game.  Lawrence of Arabia won the 
Academy Award for best picture.  Tony Bennett walked away with two Grammy Awards 
for best song “I Left My Heart in San Francisco” and best male singer.  Colonel John Glenn 
put the U.S. back in the space race and got an old fashioned ticker tape parade.  1962 was 
also the year that Twinbrook Parkway Project 1166 was authorized by the County Council 
for the construction of Twinbrook Parkway thus beginning this saga. 
Sulzer v. Montgomery County, 484 A.2d 285, 286 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (quoting the court be-
low). 
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Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, who once began a dissent in the 
following way: 
       After the seven-game 1960 world series victory by my home-
town Pittsburgh Pirates over the heavily favored New York Yan-
kees, that ended when Bill Mazeroski hit a dramatic ninth inning 
home run over Yogi Berra’s head and the left center field wall of 
Forbes Field, Yogi explained the loss by saying, “We made too 
many wrong mistakes.”  Unfortunately, our performance in the 
arena of implied bias is filled with inconsistency, if not “wrong 
mistakes,” and today’s decision only compounds the confusion.36
Another judicial “wrong mistake,” this one involving the Yankees, at least 
indirectly, appears in an opinion by Judge Randa, another baseball-savvy 
jurist from the Eastern District of Wisconsin.37  In a discussion of the state-
of-mind requirement within the statutory standard for awarding punitive 
damages in a tort case, the judge explained the second prong of the test for 
intentional disregard of the plaintiff’s rights in the following way: 
Secondly, for an outcome to be “practically certain,” it must be 
more than “reasonably probable” or “likely,” it must approach be-
ing inevitable.  For example, it is “practically certain” that shout-
ing “Fire!” in a crowded theater will cause panic.  It is not practi-
cally certain (though it is very likely) that the New York Yankees 
will go to the World Series again this year.38  
While Judge Randa is no doubt an able jurist, he proved to be a poor prog-
nosticator; the Yankees finished the 2002 season by losing to the Angels 
(and their seemingly underappreciated rally monkey),39 three games to 
  
 36. United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 177 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Crawford, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 
YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 34 (1998)).  For a discussion of judicial references to one of the most 
famous of all Yogi-isms, “déjà vu all over again,” see Parker B. Potter, Jr., A Good Piece of Paper 
Spoiled: An Eighteen-Hole Round-up of American Hole-in-One Jurisprudence, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 152 n.107 (2004). 
 37. Boomsma v. Star Transport, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
 38. Id. at 881.  In Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984), Judge Bauer of the Seventh 
(inning stretch) Circuit also mentioned a World Series defeat for the Bronx Bombers: “The Braves won 
the World Series in 1957 (defeating the almost invincible New York Yankees), and repeated as pennant 
winners in 1958.”  Id. at 574 (affirming district court decision that the taxpayer, who was owner of a 
major league baseball team, “properly allocated $10.2 million of the $10.8 million purchase price of the 
Seattle Pilots to the value of the 149 players he bought.”).  The opinion in Selig contains a tremendous 
amount of baseball history, and concludes with a quotation from the poem Casey at the Bat, “But there 
is no joy in Mudville . . .” followed by: “There should be joy somewhere in Milwaukee—the district 
court’s judgment is affirmed.”  Id. at 580. 
 39. “Some might suggest that sports fans are unsophisticated—witness the “Dog Pound” in Cleve-
land, the spiked shoulder pad wearing and face-painted fans of the Raider Nation, or the Rally Monkey 
in Anaheim—[but] I would submit that sports fans are very sophisticated.”  Don Nottingham, Com-
 
326 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 2   
one, in the first round of the playoffs.  At least the judge used fire in a 
crowded theater rather than a World Series appearance by the Yankees as 
his example of “practically certain.”  And, to be sure, appraisals of Yankee 
superiority are not without their detractors.  In a case that challenged the 
pro football draft on antitrust grounds,40 Judge MacKinnon of the D.C. 
Circuit noted, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, that “baseball insti-
tuted a draft when it became clear from the long domination of the New 
York Yankees that the farm system was not producing competitive bal-
ance,”41 and that “[a]s the New York Yankees have proved, just one free 
agent added to a strong roster by a free spending owner can assure team 
dominance and deny it to another team.”42  In his opinion for the majority, 
Judge Wilkey took a dim view of Judge MacKinnon’s ludic erudition: 
“Our colleague has reinforced his own encyclopedic knowledge of football 
with repeated references to The NFL’s Official Encyclopedia History of 
Professional Football (1977). . . .  One man’s reminiscences of a popular 
sport should not be confused with a judicial decision.”43
Notwithstanding the little bumps in the road mentioned above, the 
Yankees are, for the most part, held up by judges as the acme of achieve-
ment.  Sometimes the praise is a bit faint, as in Farley v. Farley,44 where 
the Ohio Court of Appeals used a reference to the Yankees to criticize a 
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas: 
       Trial court has muzzled this pro se defendant in pursuit of his 
Due Process Rights, and the court has erred and abused its discre-
tion by funding the piling on of two plaintiff attorneys with bias 
and prejudice that seems comparable to the New York Yankees v. 
PS # 2 Sandlot Team.  This bias is almost criminal.45
  
ment, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight 
Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1096 n.200 (2004).   
 40. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 41. Id. at 1198 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 42. Id. at 1216. 
 43. Id. at 1186 n.49. 
 44. No. 02AP-1046, 2003 WL 21405558 (Ohio Ct. App. June 19, 2003). 
 45. Id. at *3.  During his closing argument in a criminal case, a defense attorney referred to the 
Yankees to make another, less meritorious, procedural objection: 
       As I close ladies and gentlemen, I am going to ask you to do one more thing for me. 
       This trial is sort of, we are up against the Yankees in that major league ball game.  It is 
Uncle Sam and if that ain’t the New York Yankees, I don’t know who is. 
       And even the Yankees when they lead off, they don’t bat last, too. 
       Well, this game is a little different.  They lead off, and they get last licks. Just in case 
somebody should get a point across.  In case that run should score on the bottom of the 
ninth the Yankees yell it is a good thing there is ten and a half innings in the game, go back 
out there.  They also get their rebuttal, two shots there. 
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One would think that just about any big league ballclub would have a 
pretty easy time against the PS #2 Sandlot Team, but still, a reference to PS 
#2 going against the San Diego Padres would probably raise more ques-
tions than it answered. 
While the references to Yankee superiority discussed above might 
sound a bit like bunt singles, the ones that follow have been written by 
judges who decided to dig in and swing for the fences.  The Yankees refer-
ence in In re WRT Energy46 is short and sweet; Judge Keenan of the South-
ern District of New York began his factual background section by noting 
that “[t]his action . . . has outlasted a New York Yankees dynasty.”47   
In Parkland Republican Club v. City of Parkland,48 Chief Judge Zloch 
of the Southern District of Florida denied injunctive relief to a local repub-
lican club that challenged a municipal regulation that barred political or-
ganizations from participating in a local parade.49  In rejecting the plain-
tiff’s position, which was based on the premise that the government does 
not have the authority to “create a limited public forum out of a traditional 
public forum,”50 Judge Zloch explained that under the view of the First 
Amendment proposed by the plaintiff: 
[T]he City [of Parkland] could not sponsor a jazz festival in a park 
without having to allow a heavy metal, punk rock, or disco group 
the opportunity to perform as well.  Nor could a major metropoli-
tan city, such as New York, hold a parade celebrating a World Se-
ries victory by the New York Yankees on the streets of Manhattan 
without violating the First Amendment if it did not allow all other 
groups—including political groups—who wished to participate to 
enter the parade.51
  
       So the Yankees are going to get up now again, and I am not going to have an opportu-
nity to address you.  I am not going to have that chance to come up there and say what I 
would like to say in rebuttal to their rebuttal. 
       You have got that job. 
       The first thing I would ask you ladies and gentlemen to do after you select a foreperson, 
is to go in there and rebut for me.  Do that rebuttal for me.  Last licks are important.  That is 
a fair game. 
       And that is what this system is all about. 
       It is supposed to be fair.  We don’t get our last licks. 
United States v. Braziel, 609 F.2d 236, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1980).  In response, the trial judge interrupted 
defense counsel and explained the burden of proof and order of trial.  Id. at 237.  On appeal, the court 
held that the defense counsel’s remarks were improper and that the trial judge’s corrective instructions 
did not deny the defendant a fair trial.  Id. at 238.    
 46. No. 96 Civ. 3610(JFK), 96 Civ. 3611(JFK), 2005 WL 323729 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2005). 
 47. Id. at *2. 
 48. 268 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 49. Id. at 1350. 
 50. Id. at 1356. 
 51. Id. 
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It is interesting to note that while his chambers are in Ft. Lauderdale, Flor-
ida, Judge Zloch did not use his hometown Florida Marlins as his hypo-
thetical baseball champion, and the interesting becomes downright ironic 
in light of the fact that four short months after the order in Parkland Re-
publican Club came out, the Florida Marlins beat the Yankees in the 2003 
World Series.52  
For anyone who had to endure the analogy section of a standardized 
test, the next Yankees reference may trigger a nasty memory or two.  In 
IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation),53 
Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery described the 
failed Tyson/IBP merger in the following way: 
       IBP is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive of-
fices in South Dakota.  It is one of the world’s largest manufactur-
ers of beef and pork meat products. 
       Tyson, meanwhile, is the world’s largest purveyor of chicken 
products and the second-largest maker of tortillas.  Tyson is also in 
the pork products business.  Lasso is Tyson’s acquisition subsidi-
ary whose sole reason to be is to facilitate the IBP acquisition. 
       By the Merger, Tyson thus sought to become to meat, what the 
New York Yankees are to baseball.  One suspects that Babe Ruth 
would have understood Tyson’s (now-abandoned) ambition.54
In a trademark dilution case, Judge Barry of the Third Circuit used the 
fame of the Yankees to make a point about the kinds of marks that were 
intended to be protected by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: “Little if 
any analysis, of course, would be required to find marks such as ‘Buick,’ 
‘Dupont’ or ‘Kodak’ truly famous or, in the context of sports with which 
we deal here, that the mark ‘New York Yankees’ is so famous that even 
non-sports fans are well aware of it.”55  Not only are the Yankees so well 
  
 52. Judge Zloch, it seems, shares the same view of Yankee superiority that led Judge Randa to 
erroneously predict an appearance by the Yankees in the 2002 World Series. 
 53. No. CIV.A.18373, 2001 WL 406292 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 2001). 
 54. Id. at *1. 
 55. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 
2000) (Barry, J., dissenting).  As a further index to power of the Yankee mystique in realms beyond the 
playing field, it appears that Yankee apparel has considerable appeal in the world of street gangs.  See, 
e.g., In re Anthony M., No. B152418, 2002 WL 1558622, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (“The 
officer was concerned for his safety because the area was in Rolling 60’s Crips territory and appellant 
was dressed in Rolling 60’s gang attire, specifically a New York Yankees baseball hat, a Seattle Mari-
ners baseball jersey, blue shorts, and blue sneakers with blue laces.”); In re Albert H., No. B152272, 
2002 WL 459724, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. March 26, 2002) (“The ‘color of choice’ of Crips gang members 
is blue, and they often wear the logos of the Seattle Mariners or New York Yankees baseball teams.”); 
People v. Fisher, No. B147724, 2001 WL 1295413, at *1 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2001) (“Members 
of the East Coast Crips sometimes wear New York Yankees hats.”).  
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known for their success on the diamond that their trademark is recognized 
by non-sports fans, the franchise is so much bigger than life that its owner 
has become a metaphor, at least in the eyes of Justice Greenfield of the 
New York Supreme Court who, in a wrongful discharge case, noted that 
the plaintiff had been informed, prior to his employment, that his future 
boss was “a difficult man to deal with and could summarily dismiss an 
employee, not unlike George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees who 
insisted on running the show his own way.”56
IV. THE BOTTOM OF THE NINTH 
To paraphrase Joe Nuxhall,57 it is now time for me to be rounding third 
and heading for home.  Comparatively speaking, a couple of patterns 
emerge from my examination of judicial references to the Cubs, Red Sox, 
and Yankees.  First, the Cubs and the Red Sox are about even in terms of 
the raw numbers of references.  Both teams trail the Yankees, but by a 
small margin.  References to the Cubs and the Yankees skew a bit up the 
judicial food chain.  Yankees references appear in four opinions from the 
federal courts of appeals, three federal district court opinions, one opinion 
from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, one intermediate state 
appellate court opinion, and two state trial court opinion, while Cubs refer-
ences appear in a United States Supreme Court opinion, two opinions from 
the federal courts of appeals, four federal district court opinions, and one 
intermediate state appellate court opinion.  By contrast, Red Sox references 
appear in two federal trial court opinions, one state supreme court opinion, 
two opinions from intermediate state appellate courts, and four state trial 
court opinions.  Consequently, about half the Red Sox references appear in 
unreported decisions, compared with less than a third for the Yankees and 
none at all for the Cubs. 
There are geographic patterns as well.  Opinions referring to the Cubs 
tend to cluster in the midwest.  Those referring to the Red Sox tend to clus-
ter in New England.  But there are outliers, and, rather remarkably, the 
Texas Court of Appeals has issued one opinion referring to the Cubs and 
one referring to the Red Sox, albeit rather tangentially in both cases.  On 
the other hand, references to the Yankees do not tend to cluster in or 
around New York; rather, they come from courts around the country as if, 
gulp, the Yankees are somehow “America’s Team.” 
  
 56. Boyle v. Petrie Stores, Corp., 518 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
 57. Joe Nuxhall was the radio announcer who brought Cincinnati Reds baseball games to my bed-
side radio when I was growing up, and he always signed off by saying: “This is the ol’ lefthander, 
rounding third and heading for home.” 
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Of all the patterns I was able to discern, the most interesting is the pat-
tern of animosity exhibited by New York judges toward the Boston Red 
Sox.58  That attitude is exemplified by Judge Ling-Cohan’s misplaced con-
cern over the prospect of “the Red Sox dictating the rules of the World 
Series games against the Yankees”59 and by Judge Straniere’s apparent 
belief that a Red Sox victory in the World Series suggests that anything is 
possible.60  The lesson seems to be how briefly the sweet taste of success 
lingers on the tongue; even after twenty-six world championships, fans of 
the Yankees seem to find it hard to swallow the fact that one World Series 
trophy in eighty-six years has come to rest in Fenway Park.  Sad.  So sad. 
  
 58. Judge Pickard of the Connecticut Superior Court also jumped ugly on the Sox when he objected 
to characterizing the Red Sox-Yankees rivalry as “competitive,” see Barber v. Skip Barber Racing 
Sch., L.L.C., No. CV030090036S, 2005 WL 3509774, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2005), but 
because Connecticut lies squarely between the Evil Empire and Red Sox Nation, Judge Pickard cannot 
properly be considered a New York judge. 
 59. Mayor of New York v. Council of the City of New York, 800 N.Y.S.2d 349, 2005 WL 351073, 
at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2005) (unpublished table decision). 
 60. Washington v. Culotta, 9 Misc.3d 1105(A), 2005 WL 2171189, at *1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 21, 
2005) (unpublished table decision). 
 
 
